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The paper confronts two perspectives on the asymmetry of time: a
philosophical and a physical one. From the philosophical perspective, time
has fundamental asymmetries which together form an asymmetry of time:
there seems to exist something like a distinguished Now moving toward the
future; we have many traces of the past — both in our memory and in the
external world — but no traces of the future; events from the past influence
those from the future, but we have no evidence of backward causation; the
future seems to be open and we definitely cannot change the past. Because
we believe in physics as a fundamental theory describing the world, we
expect that physics should explain all of these asymmetries. However, the
rub lies in the fact that physics, as it is known at present, is unable to
explain these asymmetries. This means that physical processes such as the
entropy increase, the expansion of the Universe or those in which weak
interactions are involved only form asymmetries in time, that is, they just
represent some asymmetrical physical processes in time. The way out of
this difficulty can be sought in two directions: either we can look for a
fundamental temporally irreversible law of nature which would be able to
explain the temporal asymmetries of the world or we should look for the
solution of the issue at hand outside of physics, that is, in metaphysics.
The paper shows the difficulties of both directions of research.
DOI:10.5506/APhysPolB.48.1935
1. Introduction
I would like to confront two points of view on the asymmetry of time
— physical and philosophical — to show that there is some inconsistency
between them and explain where the problem lies. I shall also ponder how
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we can try to reconcile them and to show where we can look for a solution.
Of course, I am not able to offer a definitive solution, even less one which
could be acceptable for both sides of the discourse. But I can at least take
comfort from the fact that posing a good question is also worth pursuing.
What is the plan of the paper? First, I shall begin by introducing the
problem which I am going to analyze, that is, to explain what the problem
of the asymmetry of time consists in and why I maintain that it is still unre-
solved, or at least not fully resolved. Next, I would like to set out how this
problem appears from the physical and philosophical points of view before
ending, of course, with some conclusions. What is also interesting, is that it
will transpire that the discrimination between philosophy and physics some-
times does not coincide with discrimination between (class of) philosophers
and (class of) physicist, that is, we will encounter in the paper a case of a
great physicist who is not satisfied with physics and more philosophical than
a great philosopher that is an adherent of scientism boundlessly believing in
physics.
2. The problem
Perhaps it will be the best to begin with Einstein. This is, of course,
not an accident: Einstein was deeply interested in the foundation of nature;
the foundation of physics; and relations between them (see e.g. [1]). He was
perfectly aware of the fact that a new theory needs a new foundation and
he looked for it in philosophy (it was, for example, Mach’s principle that
said that local inertial frames are determined by the large scale distribution
of matter, or generally speaking his Kantian approach to science). So, we
can say that in his thinking physics met with philosophy.
Coming to the main point of the paper: there is the famous passage
from Einstein’s letter of condolence to his friend Michele Besso’s widow
after Besso’s death: People like us, who believe in physics, know that the
distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent
illusion. Here, we have simple four-dimensional block universe where there
is no difference between the past and the future. I would not like to consider
the problem of how seriously we should treat this statement by taking into
account the circumstances of its writing, but I would rather draw attention
to the testimony of Carnap from almost the same time (their conversations
took place between years 1952 and 1954 in Princeton while Einstein wrote
his letter of condolence in 1955); we know from this report that Einstein was
deeply troubled about lacking an explanation for the distinction between the
present, the past and the future in physics and rather dissatisfied with the
psychological, subjectivist approach to this distinction: Once Einstein said
that the problem of the Now worried him seriously. He explained that the ex-
perience of the Now means something special for man, something essentially
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different from the past and the future, but that this important difference does
not and cannot occur within physics. That this experience cannot be grasped
by science seemed to him a matter of painful but inevitable resignation. I re-
marked that all that occurs objectively can be described in science; on the
one hand the temporal sequence of events is described in physics; and, on
the other hand, the peculiarities of man’s experiences with respect to time,
including his different attitude towards past, present, and future, can be de-
scribed and (in principle) explained in psychology. But Einstein thought that
these scientific descriptions cannot possibly satisfy our human needs; that
there is something essential about the Now which is just outside the realm of
science. We both agreed that this was not a question of a defect for which
science could be blamed, as Bergson thought. (. . . ) I definitely had the im-
pression that Einstein’s thinking on this point involved a lack of distinction
between experience and knowledge. Since science in principle can say all that
can be said, there is no unanswerable question left [2, pp. 37–38].
The citation is long but it is worth recalling: here the attitude of Einstein
to the problem of the difference between the present, the past and the future
seems a little different than in the letter of condolence — he was upset about
it. And there was an interesting disagreement between Carnap and Einstein
over the question of differences between the past, the present, and the future;
while Carnap thought that science can, in principle, say all that can be said,
and if there is no differences between the past, the present, and the future in
physics, it should be included into the domain of psychology, Einstein seemed
to be not fully satisfied with such a solution. I would like to highlight the
problems which could possibly have drawn Einstein’s attention and also be
the reason for our worries, because they still seem to remain unresolved:
1. The present, which as the only one seems to exist, is still changing or
‘moving’ toward the future. The past does not seem to exist anymore
and the future is to come into being. Additionally, we are convinced
that we and other things persist over time by keeping strict identity
(philosophers call such a form of existence endurance);
2. We have many traces of the past — both in our memory and in the
external world — but no traces of the future;
3. Events from the past affected those from the present, but we have no
evidence of backward causation (that is, causation is always future
directed);
4. The future seems to be open while the past is fixed and we cannot
definitely change it.
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The second property seems to be a consequence of the third one: past
events left traces because they were able to affect the later ones causally (or
physically). Nevertheless, the second property is so important feature of our
world that I leave it on the list.
All the asymmetries mentioned above concern fundamental phenomena
of our everyday experience pertaining to time and form something which
is called the asymmetry of time itself. They should be distinguished from
asymmetries in time of some physical processes, which do not relate to the
fundamental properties of time, such as, for example, when we say Thank
goodness that’s over after an illness, rather than before it. The problem of
the direction of time has originated from our attempts to understand these
fundamental asymmetries and every plausible theory of the direction of time
should explain them1.
The essential difference between the past and the future, and the essential
role of the present is that the present separates what is fixed and known (by
traces) and cannot be changed any more, that is the past, from this which
can only be predicted but — at least sometimes — can be affected, that
is the future. It means that our understanding of the differences between
the past, the future and the present also has to consist of understanding the
origin of the asymmetry of time.
Now, returning to the debate between Carnap and Einstein: was Carnap
right that the differences between the past, the present and the future, and
the special part of these differences formed by the aforementioned asymme-
tries of time are only a matter of psychology or did rather Einstein have a
genuine reason to be worried? I claim that Carnap was mistaken and that
he did not understand the problem. Let us return to our list of phenomena
which asymmetry of time consists of and give Carnap and his adherents as
much advantage as it is possible, that is, let us remove from this list any
possible subjectivist phenomena. So, let us:
1. Treat our conviction that the passage of time is only a consequence of
the fact that we have traces of the past and no traces of the future in
our memory and that it is a consequence of the third claim concerning
the fact that causation is always future directed;
2. Resign from persistence by endurance toward the future and let us
assume that it is an illusion and that instead of this we consist of
temporal parts (such as things consist of spatial parts);
1 The first work known to me, in which this distinction was used, was Sklar [3] although
it was only introduced there by the conditions (2–4). Sklar stresses in his papers that
for a theory of asymmetry of time to be acceptable it should explain the fundamental
time asymmetries (2–4).
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3. Resign from explanation of the temporal asymmetry of our memory
concerning the past and the future (assuming that it could be an illu-
sion);
4. Assume that our conviction about existence of the open future is an
illusion despite of indeterministic quantum mechanics.
Now, there still remain — contrary to what was claimed by Carnap —
two objective asymmetric phenomena which the asymmetry of time consists
of and which certainly do not belong to the domain of psychology:
1. We have many traces of the past in the external world but no traces
of the future;
2. Events from the past affected those from the present, but we have no
evidence of backward causation (that is, causation is always future
directed).
So, despite giving Carnap some important advantages (resigning from
indeterminism and our conviction about retaining our strict identity over
time) there remain two important objective aspects of the asymmetry of
time which cry out for an explanation. And an important question arises:
how we can explain them?
3. The asymmetry of time from the physical point of view
Despite some important exceptions, one can say that it is a common view
among physicists that there is no flow of time in physics. So, for example,
Paul Davies — a physicist deeply interested in the physics of time asymmetry
— states with certainty that: Nothing in known physics corresponds to the
passage of time. Indeed, physicists insist that time doesn’t flow at all; it
merely is [4, p. 40].
The four-dimensional spacetime block does not appear to leave room for
the flow of time. However, if the flow of time does not exist, what is the
source of the above-mentioned asymmetries of time?
It seems that we should look for an origin of the asymmetry of time
within our laws of nature rather than within some de facto asymmetries
which depend on the initial or boundary conditions of the universe because
these last ones would form asymmetries of some physical processes in time
rather than the asymmetry of time itself. The point is, however, that the
electrodynamic, strong and gravitational interactions are invariant under
time reversal and as such cannot distinguish any direction of time. In turn,
weak interactions are not time reversal invariant, but they are not involved in
the processes leading to the coming into existence of the traces of the past
which we observe in everyday life (such as, for example, books, historical
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monuments or a wet road after rain). They are also not responsible for
future oriented causation. And this is why Feynman noticed a long time
ago, shortly after the discovery of the CP symmetry violation, that the
distinction between the past and the future cannot depend on asymmetries
of weak interactions because in normal situations, for example when we
are speaking, writing, walking, watching TV etc., weak interactions are not
involved2.
What is more, I would say that time is maximally asymmetric because
we have no traces of the future and we know no cases of backward causation
while the weak interactions are only feebly asymmetric, that is, for any weak
process, a time-reversed sequence of events (the reverse sequence of time
reversed states) is possible although it can have a different probability. This
is an additional reason for which we cannot appeal to weak interactions to
explain the asymmetry of time.
What has remained, and for a long time has been considered as a possi-
ble source of the asymmetry of time, was the process of increasing entropy.
For example, Ludwig Boltzmann in his well-known Lectures on Gas The-
ory proposed to explain the direction of time just as a direction of rising
entropy. He tried to consider the unique directionality of time given to us
by experience as a mere illusion arising from our specially restricted view-
point [7, p. 401]. He wrote: One can think of the world as a mechanical
system of an enormously large number of constituents, and of an immensely
long period of time, so that the dimensions of that part containing our own
‘fixed stars’ are minute compared to the extension of the universe; and times
that we call eons are likewise minute compared to such a period. Then in
the universe, which is in thermal equilibrium throughout and therefore dead,
there will occur here and there relatively small regions of the same size as
our galaxy (we call them single worlds) which, during the relative short time
of eons, fluctuate noticeably from thermal equilibrium, and indeed the state
probability in such cases will be equally likely to increase or decrease. For
the universe, the two directions of time are indistinguishable, just as in space
there is no up or down. However, just as at a particular place on the earth’s
surface we call ‘down’ the direction toward the centre of the earth, so will a
living being in a particular time interval of such a single world distinguish
the direction of time toward the less probable state from the opposite direc-
tion (the former toward the past, the latter toward the future). By virtue of
this terminology, such small isolated regions of the universe will always find
themselves ‘initially’ in an improbable state. This method seems to me to be
the only way in which one can understand the second law — the heat death
of each single world — without a unidirectional change of the entire universe
from a definite initial state to a final state [7, pp. 402–403].
2 Feynman [5, ch. 5]. See also Sklar [3] and Gołosz [6].
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Again the citation is long but interesting; Boltzmann compares the di-
rections of time to the directions of space and claims that the direction of
time is nothing more than the direction from less to more probable states. Is
this explanation plausible? Unfortunately not, because he offers no mecha-
nism responsible for the asymmetry of traces and directionality of causation,
there is no explanation of them. And, what is even more important, if the
arrow of time was defined (or determined) by entropy increase, the claim
that entropy always increases in an isolated system, that is, the second law
of thermodynamics, would only be a tautology3. I do not suppose that we
could desire something like this. Thus it seems that the rise of entropy is
only a physical process which is asymmetrical in time.
Perhaps, we can hope that our future more general theory which we are
looking for, such as the Theory of Everything (ToE) or Quantum Grav-
ity (QG), will be temporally asymmetrical and will be able to resolve the
problem of the asymmetry of time. So Penrose, for example, in his The
Emperor’s New Mind claimed that our sought-for quantum gravity must
be a time-asymmetric theory4. Not all physicists agree with such a pos-
tulate but we have an interesting time-asymmetric approach to QG called
Causal Dynamical Triangulation (CDT), developed by Jan Ambjørn, Jerzy
Jurkiewicz, and Renate Loll, in which spacetime has a built-in arrow of time
which should allow one to distinguish between causes and effects5. If we
assume that CDT in some way grounds the fundamental asymmetry of time
we experience in everyday life, such a line of attack seems to be very promis-
ing because it could make it possible to explain why we have no traces of the
future and no cases of backward causation. I would like to notice, however,
that although such an approach based on the spacetime with a built-in arrow
of time makes it possible to distinguish between causes and effects, it still
does not explain what is the origin of the asymmetry (or arrow) of time. It
simply takes for granted that it is a primitive property of spacetime which
cannot be derived from a more fundamental theory. But, to fully assess such
a conception, we have to wait until this theory (CDT) receives its final form.
Now, I would like to turn to a slightly different approach to the problem
of the asymmetry of time: a philosophical one.
3 This was noticed by Eddington [8, p. 93]. See also Earman [9], Sklar [3], and
Gołosz [10].
4 Penrose [11, pp. 344–345, 350–353].
5 See e.g. Ambjørn, Jurkiewicz, Loll [12] and Ambjørn, Görlich, Jurkiewicz, Loll [13].
As I understand this conception, spacetime emerges dynamically from causal time-
asymmetric processes.
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4. The asymmetry of time from the philosophical point of view
Because an approach invoking entropy increase failed, it seems that what
remains is to invoke asymmetrical causal relations. So, let us assume that
the asymmetry of causation is really responsible for the asymmetry of time,
that we have no traces of the future and there are no cases of backward
causation. Then what remains to be considered is to explain what is the
source of the asymmetry of causation, whether is it possible to find an ori-
gin of this asymmetry based on some time-asymmetrical physical processes
which do not appeal implicitly to the asymmetry of time itself. The solution
to this conundrum could seem apparently to be simple; causation is time-
asymmetrical, effects always occur after causes, so is not this very property
responsible for the asymmetry of traces and asymmetry of causation?
This answer is, unfortunately, implausible because, firstly — indepen-
dently of which definition of causation we adopt, it is reasonable to assume
— that in the causal relations which we are interested in, there are always
physical interactions involved and these are time reversal invariant (exclud-
ing weak interactions, of course). So why cannot the effects of such inter-
actions precede their causes? And secondly — more generally — if just
the causation was responsible for the successions of events, why then do
we also have many cases of the succession of events which are not causally
connected?
Since the time of David Hume, philosophers distinguish between causes
and effects with the aim of the asymmetrical relation of temporal priority by
calling causes those events that occur earlier and effects those which occur
later. So in such a case, a time asymmetric relation of temporal priority
is used to distinguish them in a similar way as it is at present assumed in
CDT. Then, however, the essential problem arises as to what is responsible
for the asymmetry of this relation? Considerable efforts have been made by
philosophers to find an origin — other than temporal, of course — of such an
asymmetrical relation of temporal priority in vain simply because physical
interactions (modulo weak interactions) are time reversal invariant.
Then, perhaps, we should assume that the relation of temporal priority is
simply a primitive property of the temporal directionality of our world which
does not need further explanations, because some relations and properties
of the world have to be primitive?6 After all — one can argue — we cannot
try to explain all the properties we find in the world ad infinitum.
6 This is exactly the position taken by Sklar [3, pp. 399, 410–411] because according
to him the causal theory of time is implausible and if any reduction thesis has any
plausibility at all, it is that which alleges the definability of causal notions by temporal
notions and not that which maintains the definability of the temporal by the causal
[3, p. 343].
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The assessment of such a proposal depends on what aims we posit: if
we simply want to distinguish causes from their effects, this procedure is
plausible because then the explanation of the asymmetry of time is not our
aim. The situation changes fundamentally if we want to explain the origin
of the time asymmetry of the world because then, assuming the primitive
unexplainable property of temporal directionality of our world, it would
mean either the resignation of the explanation of a fundamental and bizarre
— taking into account that physical interactions are time reversal invariant
(excluding the weak interactions, of course) — property of our world, or
— if we propose a causal theory of direction of time based on the idea of
primitive property of temporal directionality of our world — we fall into
a vicious circle in our reasoning: we then claim that time is asymmetrical
because it is asymmetrical!
So, what remains is either to wait for a plausible physical theory which
will be able to explain the origin of the asymmetry of time or to develop
a metaphysical conception based on our everyday experience according to
which there exists the flow of time, and to claim that it is responsible for the
arrow of time. If there is the flow of time, then even if physical interactions
which are involved in some events are time reversal invariant, due to the
passage of time their consequences can be observed after these interactions.
Is it naïve? I would say that not at all; the fact that we have sophisticated
thinkers coming from very different directions who should rather not be
suspected of being naïve; I will limit myself to Bergson and Eddington.
Both develop idea of becoming, which is the most promising view on the
passage of time7: Matter or mind, reality has appeared to us as a perpetual
becoming. It makes itself or it unmakes itself, but it is never something
made [15, p. 296]. The flux of time is the reality itself, and the things which
we study are the things which flow [15, p. 374].
And Eddington, who wrote in Chapter V, entitled Becoming, of The
Nature of Physical World : It is absurd to pretend that we have no justifiable
conception of ‘becoming’ in the external world. That dynamic quality — that
significance which makes a development from past to future reasonable and
a development from future to past farcical — has to do much more than
pull the trigger of a nerve. It is so welded into our consciousness that a
moving on of time is a condition of consciousness. We have direct insight
into ‘becoming’ which sweeps aside all symbolic knowledge as on an inferior
plane. If I grasp the notion of existence because I myself exist, I grasp the
notion of becoming because I myself become [8, p. 97].
7 See e.g. Savitt [14, (2001–2014)] and Gołosz [10].
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What is emphasized here by Eddington is that becoming, or the moving
on of time — contrary to what was claimed by Carnap — is an objective
process which is a necessary condition of our experience.
The notion of becoming can be further elaborated to the form of dy-
namic existence in order to introduce enduring: things dynamically exist
by directional endurance toward the future and thanks to this they keep
strict identity over time and — so to say — they can ‘carry’ traces of past
interactions into the future8.
Such a metaphysical approach introducing the flow of time has some
advantages and some disadvantages. The advantages are the following:
1. Because becoming has a directional character, it explains the arrow of
time, and especially why we can assume that causes precede their ef-
fects despite the time-symmetry of physical interactions (modulo weak
interactions, of course).
2. It explains why we observe the world in statu nascendi, that is, in the
course of being developed, and why we are so interested in empirical
sciences in the analysis of the evolution of physical systems (for exam-
ple, the evolution of the Universe) or evolution of biological systems
(in the theory of evolution), and why we are developing ourselves.
3. It explains why we and other things persist over time keeping strict
identity (that is, why we and other things endure).
The important disadvantage of such a metaphysical solution to the prob-
lem of asymmetry of time is that it introduces a large part of hard meta-
physics into the heart of our knowledge about the physical world, that is, it
would deserve an essential limitation imposed on the capabilities of physics.
In other words, it would mean an acceptance of the fact that physics would
be unable to explain a fundamental property of our world — existence of the
flow of time. Are we able to accept such a limitation imposed on physics?
I am not sure.
Interestingly enough, the above-mentioned approaches — the physical
and the philosophical ones — do not have to be inconsistent; they can be
complementary as well. If, for example, in Causal Dynamical Triangulation,
it is assumed that the asymmetry of time is a primitive property of spacetime
which cannot be derived from a more fundamental physical theory, a meta-
physical origin of the arrow of time can be simply added to this conception
in the form of an idea of the flow of time.
8 See Gołosz [10, 16].
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5. Conclusions
My main goal of this paper was to draw attention to the deep and still
unresolved problem of the asymmetry of time. I have highlighted two possi-
ble directions of research which could lead to its solution, a solution which
could even turn out to be complementary. Of course, as it often happens, a
future development of science can surprise us by a quite unexpected solution
to the problem under consideration. What is certain is that the problem is
fundamental and cries out for an explanation.
In writing this paper, I have acquired a number of intellectual debts:
I should mention in particular Lawrence Sklar, John Earman and Steven
Savitt. I would like also to thank Paweł Moskal for the inspiration and
Wojciech Wiślicki for his helpful remarks. The errors which remain in the
text are, of course, only my own.
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